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felt the

latter's

was through

to the philosophical con-

was rather on the physical side that he
power more full}' and this is to be expected for

ceptions of Descartes,

it
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his physical teachings that

Spinoza

first

made

his

would be reasonable to assume
that the Cartesian physics played no small part in defining his
philosophical development and that this is so can be seen not only
by the appearance in Deo ct Hotninc, and by traces in the Efliica,

Such being the
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case,
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of Descartes' account of motion, but equal!}- as well
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the material world.
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In several places, Spinoza speaks of "certain things imniediatel}produced by God." in explanation of which he oilers the following
"As pertaining to Xatura
passage in his essay on God and Man
:

naturata in general, that
diately
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the

modes or creatures

depend on God or are created

and only two, namely, motions
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thinking thing.
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we
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him, of such
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imme-

we know two

and understanding

in the

say that they have been from

all

remain immutable, a work certainly as great as befits the greatness of the master- worker (part i,
In another passage, he says that extended bodies differ
cap. 9)."^
onl}' in "proportion of rest and motion;'" and that a body is impelled
to motion by the impact of another body possessing motion greater
than its rest (Deo et Homine, part ii^ note ad init. and cap. 19) ;eternity,

and

to all eternity shall
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while in the Tracfatus Theologico-Politicus

of res niaxiine universales
et

et toti

(c.vii. No. 27) we read
naturae communes, videlicet motiiui

And

quietem, eoriimque leges et regulas.

in a letter of

1675,

he gives motion and rest as examples of those "things immediately
produced by God." For Spinoza, then, motion and rest were not
relative terms but real things.

According
erally, consists

to Descartes, matter, or

any body considered gen-

only in extension in three dimensions, and not in

hardness, weight or any other such quality; and that all matter
is ultimately homogeneous {in toto imiverso una et eadem existit)
;

while the variations in

its

properties are determined by differences

of motion {oninis materiae variatio, sive
diversitas,

pendet a motu)

,

by nullum esse permanentem uUius
cogitatione

nostra

omnium

eius

the relative nature of which

deferminatur.

quantity of motion in the universe

rci

locum,

nisi

Furthermore, he
is

formarum
is shown

quatcnns a
tells

us,

the

constant, a proposition which

he demonstrates a priori from the perfection of God; and from
which we are to assume that God not only maintains a rigid immutability in his

operations but that in the beginning he created a

and rest which he preserves unchanged
materiam siimd cum motu et quiete in principio creavit, ianiqite
per solum suum concursum ordinarium tantundem niotus et quietis
certain quantity of motion

in ea toto,

quontum time

posuit, conservat.

Rest, however,

is

not a

and though Descartes did not probably look upon it in
that sense, he yet appears to be somewhat confused on this point
for he says somewhat later that motion is contrary to rest, and
that speed is contrary to slowness "inasmuch as such slowness
shares the nature of rest."
And though Spinoza speaks of finite
existence as "de nihilo participans, "partaking of nullity [cogit.
Met. pt. ii.c. 3. Xo. 1), it is clear that he did not view nothing as a
real thing.
In any case, he accepted without question the conservation of motion as prescribed by Descartes, which principle, though
not true, indicates at least that Descartes was not far from a definite
real thing,

truth, only

he lacked the patience to carry his speculations

to their

logical conclusion.

is

By the term "quantity of motion" Descartes understood what
now known as momentum, a quantity which has direction as well

as magnitude, though he failed to take this into consideration for

he assumed that the sum of indiscriminately directed quantities was
constant, a proposition not only erroneous but incomprehensible as
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To

direction, "the determination of

and further asserts that the

total

not only the same after as before a collision

same even though the

of two bodies but remains the

And though

reversed.
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gi\en by which velocity can be determined.

is

him. motion
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Till-:

direction

is

he avers that such two bodies must be

viewed as an independent system (a reliquis onimhus sic diz'isia itf
corinu motus a nullis aliis circuiniaccntibus iiupcdirciifitr Jicc iiiz'arciificr), he mentions cases in which one of them is at rest, as well
as of cases in which the}' move with different velocities.
That his
results Avere
is

wrong

is

beside the point

that Spinoza accepted

What
him

all

;

what

is

more

interesting

his rules except one.'"

Descartes was after was a principle which would enable
universe as a machine self-acting and selfand by postulating an original creative act which fur-

to treat the material

contained

;

nished the matter of the universe with

its

fixed "quantit}- of motion."

he was able to effectively meet theological criticism, at that time a

no small matter; while Spinoza, fully con\inced of the perfect unity
of the divine nature and its manifestations, found in his s\stem
scientific

evidence in proof of that unity and uniformit}' which

speculation had alread}' led him to anticipate in the ph}sical world.

In naming
in their

luotiis ct quics as

being those things not

kind but necessary to the existence of

finite

onl}- infinite

things of the

same kind, looking upon water as merely figured extension, Spinoza's views of motion and rest, though derived from the most confused part of the Cartesian ph}'sics, become, in a sense, intelligible,
for

and energy of position

substituting energy of motion

b}'

rather happy result

is

attained.

a

Beside being the most fundamental

propert}' of the physical world, energy

is

continually passing, in

from one portion of matter to another:
while equally as well the sum of kinetic energy and potential energ}is constant.
From which it follows, that if energy is taken as this
sum, it becomes that which is infinite and immutable.
all

natural phenomena,

Spinoza, besides being indebted to Descartes for his ph}sical
ideas,

derived

ps}xhology and

from him. as well,
ethics.
According

37). "everything, in so far as
in the

is

starting-point

for

human

Descartes [Princ. Phil.

2.c.

simple and undivided, remains

same condition and undergoes no change unless from external
a proposition which is repeated by Spinoza in much

causes,"
3

it

his
to

Epistle 15, No. 10.
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same words of his "Principles of Cartesian Philosophy:"
Unaquaeque res, qiiatemis simplex et indivisa est, ct in se sola coiisideratur, quantum in sc est, semper in eodem statu perseverat.

the

though the demonstration he offers is couched in such language as
to indicate that to him it was something more than merely physical :^
while in the C agitata Metaphysica appears the idea of the selfpreserving effort of things, "conatus quo res in statu suo perseverae
conantur," this effort being merely the thing itself, in illustration
"Motion has the
of which Spinoza gives the first law of motion:

power of

persisting in

nothing but the motion

itself,

Now

actual condition.
that

is,

this

the fact that such

While furthermore, Unaquaeque

of motion."^
est, in

its

itself,

power

is

the nature

is

res, qiiautiim

se

in

suo esse perseverare conatur, (Everything, so far as it is in
endeavours to persist in its own being) and Conatus, quo
"^

unaquaque res

in suo

esse perseverare conatur,

ipsius rei actualcni cssentiam,

endeavours

persist

to

in

nihil

est

praetcr

(The endeavour wherewith everything

own

its

being

is

nothing else than the

actual essence of the thing itself)' expressed in physical

terms

simply means that no change can take place in a system without

work being done.
Yet, despite

all

he owed to the physical conceptions of Descartes.
life, became deeply dissatisfied with

Spinoza, towards the end of his

them, as can be seen from his letters to Tschirnhausen in 1676.
Asked how we would prove a priori the existence of bodies figured

and

in

motion,^ Spinoza answers that

difficult

if

matter at rest
well,

will

"From

extension as con-

an inert mass (molem quiescentem)
not impossible to prove the existence of bodies.

ceived by Descartes,

i.

e.

so far as in

will,

it

lies,

persist in

not be impelled to motion unless by a

external cause

for this reason,

;

I

its

rest,

it

is

For

and, as

more powerful

did not hesitate to affirm long ago

that the Cartesian principles of natural philosophy are useless,

if

According to Tschirnhausen, Descartes, as he su})posed motion to have been given to matter by a creative act, did not
view the material universe as a product of inert matter; to which
Spinoza replied somewhat as follows: "As to your question if the
not absurd."
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diversity of things can be proved a priori

extension,
possible

;

identical

I

believe

and

that,

?/:>

from the conception of

have ah-eady sufficiently shown that it is imtherefore, matter is ill-defined b_\' Descartes as
I

with extension

{iuatcriaui

a

Cartesio

male

dcfiniri

per

extensionem), but must rather be explained by an attribute which
expresses an eternal and infinite nature." And though he hoped to
be able to

came.

make

himself clearer on this point, the opportunity never

But what

is

clear at least

is

that Spinoza did not accept, in

his last days, the Cartesian conception of material substance as con-

sisting purel}' in extension.

